The frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher model: diffusive and non-diffusive approximations

We study a class of processes that are akin to the Wright-Fisher model, with transition probabilities weighted in terms of the frequency-dependent fitness of the population types. By considering an approximate weak formulation of the discrete problem, we are able to derive a corresponding continuous weak formulation for the probability density. Therefore, we obtain a family of partial differential equations (PDE) for the evolution of the probability density, and which will be an approximation of the discrete process in the joint large population, small time-steps and weak selection limit. If the fitness functions are sufficiently regular, we can recast the weak formulation in a more standard formulation, without any boundary conditions, but supplemented by a number of conservation laws. The equations in this family can be purely diffusive, purely hyperbolic or of convection-diffusion type, with frequency dependent convection. The particular outcome will depend on the assumed scalings. The diffusive equations are of the degenerate type; using a duality approach, we also obtain a frequency dependent version of the Kimura equation without any further assumptions. We also show that the convective approximation is related to the replicator dynamics and provide some estimate of how accurate is the convective approximation, with respect to the convective-diffusion approximation. In particular, we show that the mode, but not the expected value, of the probability distribution is modelled by the replicator dynamics. Some numerical simulations that illustrate the results are also presented

Spin Calogero Particles and Bispectral Solutions of the Matrix KP Hierarchy

Pairs of $n\times n$ matrices whose commutator differ from the identity by a matrix of rank $r$ are used to construct bispectral differential operators with $r\times r$ matrix coefficients satisfying the Lax equations of the Matrix KP hierarchy. Moreover, the bispectral involution on these operators has dynamical significance for the spin Calogero particles system whose phase space such pairs represent. In the case $r=1$, this reproduces well-known results of Wilson and others from the 1990's relating (spinless) Calogero-Moser systems to the bispectrality of (scalar) differential operators. This new class of pairs $(L, \Lambda)$ of bispectral matrix differential operators is different than those previously studied in that $L$ acts from the left, but $\Lambda$ from the right on a common $r\times r$ eigenmatrix.Comment: 16 page

From Local to Global Dilemmas in Social Networks

Social networks affect in such a fundamental way the dynamics of the population they support that the global, population-wide behavior that one observes often bears no relation to the individual processes it stems from. Up to now, linking the global networked dynamics to such individual mechanisms has remained elusive. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in networked populations and let individuals interact via a 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma – a characteristic defection dominant social dilemma of cooperation. We show how homogeneous networks transform a Prisoner's Dilemma into a population-wide evolutionary dynamics that promotes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors, while heterogeneous networks promote their coordination. To this end, we define a dynamic variable that allows us to track the self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors in networked populations. Using the same variable, we show how the global dynamics — and effective dilemma — co-evolves with the motifs of cooperators in the population, the overall emergence of cooperation depending sensitively on this co-evolution

Indirect Reciprocity under Incomplete Observation

Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

Social norms of cooperation in small-scale societies

Indirect reciprocity, besides providing a convenient framework to address the evolution of moral systems, offers a simple and plausible explanation for the prevalence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. By helping someone, an individual may increase her/his reputation, which may change the pre-disposition of others to help her/him in the future. This, however, depends on what is reckoned as a good or a bad action, i.e., on the adopted social norm responsible for raising or damaging a reputation. In particular, it remains an open question which social norms are able to foster cooperation in small-scale societies, while enduring the wide plethora of stochastic affects inherent to finite populations. Here we address this problem by studying the stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct social norms, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on the community size. However, only a single norm systematically leads to the highest cooperative standards in small communities. That simple norm dictates that only whoever cooperates with good individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation, a pattern that proves robust to errors, mutations and variations in the intensity of selection.This research was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants SFRH/BD/94736/2013, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014 and by multi-annual funding of CBMA and INESC-ID (under the projects UID/BIA/04050/2013 and UID/CEC/50021/2013 provided by FCT). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio